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Reevaluating Spending in Gubernatorial Races:
Job Approval as a Baseline for Spending Effects
KEDRON BARDWELL, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY
Research on campaign spending has tried to resolve the issue of differential effects for incumbent and challenger spending. This analysis offers two new perspectives to the spending effects literature: (1) It extends the
scope of this research to include gubernatorial elections, and (2) it uses job approval ratings to control for governors’ popularity. This approval measure sets a pre-campaign baseline for the expected vote that keeps campaign variables from being credited with pre-existing levels of incumbent popularity. A two-stage least squares
(TSLS) analysis of two decades of gubernatorial races shows that incumbent spending (unlike challenger
spending) does not have a significant effect on the vote. If incumbent spending wins little new support in the
course of campaigns, generous public funding for statewide candidates will boost spending by challengers
without reducing challenger competitiveness via higher incumbent spending.

it uses newly available data on gubernatorial job approval
ratings to control for incumbent vulnerability in the year
before the election. This measure sets a baseline for the
expected vote and keeps variables that intervene in a campaign from taking credit for pre-campaign levels of incumbent popularity. After a literature review that highlights
methodological issues in research on spending effects,
instruments for incumbent and challenger spending are
constructed and used in a TSLS regression analysis of races
from 1980 to 2000. By controlling for the governor’s vulnerability, the analysis shows that incumbent spending does
not have an independent effect on the vote. This implies
that governors’ spending buys little new support in the
course of general election campaigns.

I

n both state and federal campaigns, incumbents have
high success rates when they run for reelection. Members of the media and many scholars attribute this fact to
the “perks of the office” and other inherent advantages of
incumbency, especially incumbents’ ability to raise and
spend more money than challengers. But is an advantage in
campaign spending the main source of incumbents’ near
invulnerability? Undoubtedly, there is a large disparity
between incumbent and challenger fundraising in most state
and federal elections. From 1980 to 2000, on average,
gubernatorial challengers raised and spent only 61 percent as
much money as their incumbent opponents did. In this same
period of time, U.S. Senate challengers faced comparable
fundraising disparities in their bids to unseat incumbents.
And gubernatorial and senatorial challengers both fared
better than challengers in U.S. House races (Herrnson 2000).
Even so, there are conflicting research findings on the
real effects of campaign spending in these races. Scholars
agree that challenger spending reduces incumbents’ share of
the vote, but findings regarding the effects of incumbent
spending have varied based on how models of the vote are
specified. Research using ordinary least-squares (OLS)
regression tends to show that spending by incumbents has
little independent effect on the vote (Abramowitz 1988,
1991). But because candidates’ and contributors’ expectations about the closeness of a race influence fundraising and
spending levels, most scholars use two-stage least-squares
(TSLS) regression to correct for simultaneity bias. Some
TSLS analyses confirm OLS findings (Jacobson 1978, 1980,
1985), but others indicate that the dollar-for-dollar impact
of incumbent spending is just as large as that of challenger
spending (Green and Krasno 1988, 1990; Gerber 1998).
This article uses new data and tests a theoretical perspective that aims to shed light on this debate. It builds on
previous research in two ways. First, it extends the scope of
spending effects research to gubernatorial elections. Second,

RESEARCH ON SPENDING EFFECTS
The effects of campaign spending on the vote are hard to
measure. This is due in part to the fact that spending is
strategic: incumbents who are vulnerable spend more than
incumbents whose seats are safe (Green and Krasno 1990).
This relationship between spending and the expected vote
causes basic OLS models to underestimate the impact of
incumbent spending and overestimate the influence of challenger spending (Erikson and Palfrey 2000; Gerber 1998).
As such, recent research has focused on how to correct for
the simultaneity bias between incumbent spending and elite
expectations of the vote (Abramowitz 1988, 1991; Erikson
and Palfrey 1998, 2000; Gerber 1998; Green and Krasno
1988, 1990; Jacobson 1978, 1980, 1985, 1990). Still,
scholars have struggled to find instruments for spending
that predict well and are derived from factors exogenous to
the vote (Jacobson 1990: 342).
Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985, 1990) authored the seminal research on spending effects in congressional elections.
After analyzing House and Senate races from the 1970s and
1980s, his conclusion is that while spending by challengers
has a large impact on incumbents’ share of the vote, incumbent spending has a much smaller effect. Jacobson’s
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explanation for the inefficiency of incumbent spending
hinges on incumbents’ high visibility and name recognition
among the voting public. In his words, “incumbents usually
exploit their official resources for reaching constituents so
thoroughly that the additional increment of information
about their virtues put forth during the campaign adds comparatively little to what is already known and felt about
them” (2000: 44-45). Although this theory is plausible and
Jacobson’s evidence supports it, some scholars question his
model specification and the choice of instruments for incumbent spending (Bartels 1991; Green and Krasno 1988).
Other scholars have sought better instruments for use in
TSLS regression.1 Such research is exemplified by Green
and Krasno (1988, 1990). In a replication of Jacobson’s
(1980) study of spending effects in congressional races,
Green and Krasno contend that Jacobson underestimates
the impact of incumbent spending. Their criticism is that
Jacobson’s instruments contain factors endogenous to
incumbents’ vote share and are weakly related to real
incumbent spending. Green and Krasno (1988) propose a
new instrument, one primarily comprised of incumbent
spending in the previous election, and subsequently find
that incumbent spending is very effective. Yet their instrument has been criticized because prior spending is highly
correlated with the explanatory variables in the vote share
model (Bartels 1991: 790; Jacobson 1990: 337).
In a study of U.S. Senate races, Gerber (1998) highlights these problems in creating valid spending instruments and offers a new solution. First, unlike other studies, his analysis treats spending by incumbents and
challengers as endogenous to the vote. This assumption is
ideal if not always practical given available data because
challengers, like incumbents, raise and spend more money
in close races (Green and Krasno 1988: 904-06; Jacobson
1990: 335). Second, by building instruments with the
help of variables that do not have a direct impact on the
vote (state population, challenger wealth, and spending in
the state’s other Senate race), he avoids a sticking point in
prior work. After correcting for simultaneity, Gerber finds
that incumbent spending and challenger spending have
comparable effects on vote share. So in U.S. Senate races,
incumbent spending matters over and above the other
advantages of incumbency.
Recent research on spending effects focuses mostly on
congressional races. Few studies analyze campaign spending

1

Some studies use methods other than two-stage least squares to analyze
the effects of congressional campaign spending. Abramowitz (1988,
1991) controls for elite expectations of the vote outcome using seat
safety ratings published in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Unfortunately, the ratings are not available for most gubernatorial elections in
this time period. Kenny and McBurnett (1992, 1994) use individuallevel survey data to examine the impact of incumbent and challenger
spending on the vote. Erikson and Palfrey (1998, 2000) use a formal
model and a simultaneous equations analysis to test for conditions in
which incumbent spending matters. Findings from these studies show
that incumbent spending matters, even if its dollar-for-dollar impact is
sometimes not as large as that of challenger spending.

in statewide contests, specifically gubernatorial elections.2
Because gubernatorial elections are similar in size and scope
to U.S. Senate races, they have the potential to shed light on
standing controversies in congressional research. Unfortunately, a data set that separates spending for primary and
general elections has not been available. Existing research on
gubernatorial races has relied on spending data aggregated
for the election cycle (Patterson 1982; Partin 2002).3 Patterson conducted an early multivariate analysis of the effects of
spending on the vote. In an OLS regression analysis of gubernatorial elections in 1978, he finds that spending by incumbents is as effective as challenger spending. Yet Patterson’s
study uses election-cycle data on spending and does not correct for simultaneity between spending and the expected
vote, so its findings should be interpreted cautiously.
Partin (2002) recently revisited Jacobson’s work on
spending effects in an analysis of gubernatorial elections
from 1977 to 1994. In a two-stage least squares (TSLS)
analysis using instrumental variables for incumbent spending, Partin finds that spending by incumbents is not wasted
money. Dollar for dollar, incumbent spending is just as
effective as that of challengers. Although this study makes a
contribution to a neglected area of inquiry, the data are less
than ideal. First, his instruments for spending are weakly
related to actual spending. The study also uses spending
data that are aggregated for entire gubernatorial election
cycles. This makes it impossible to determine how much of
this spending occurred during the primary rather than in
the general election. These problems reduce confidence in
the findings.
The analysis that follows takes a number of steps to avoid
the methodological pitfalls of previous research on spending
effects. First, it uses separate data on general election spending. A full explanation of the data is located in the Appendix.
Second, it presents valid instruments for use in TSLS analysis
that are strong proxies for actual spending and that include
variables exogenous to incumbents’ share of the vote. Third,
it treats incumbent spending and challenger spending as
endogenous variables, given that spending by both types of
candidates varies based on the vulnerability of the incumbent
governor (Gerber 1998). Finally, it includes in the models a
2

3

Scholars have studied the impact of incumbency (Piereson 1977; Tompkins 1984), state partisanship (Patterson 1982), the economy (Partin
1995), and challenger quality (Squire 1992; Squire and Fastnow 1994)
on the gubernatorial vote. Beyle (1996) conducts bivariate analysis using
his extensive data on total spending in these races, but multivariate
analyses of spending effects in gubernatorial races are rare.
Prior studies’ reliance on election-cycle spending reflects the limitations
of available data. State reporting periods vary, and there are disparities in
the availability of data from state campaign finance archives. Most scholars rely on spending figures compiled by Beyle (1986, 1990a, b, 1991,
1996), the major drawback being that some of these data are aggregated
for the election cycle. It is true that all spending, even in the primary
period, influences the general election vote by increasing name recognition and issue visibility. But the case for using election-cycle data falls
apart if better data (primary and general spending figures) are available.
Separate data reflect the different spending patterns in the two types of
races (Epstein and Zemsky 1995).
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measure of incumbent vulnerability: governors’ mean job
approval rating in the pre-election year. This is a baseline
against which the impact of other independent variables on
incumbents’ campaign-year performance can be measured.
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES FOR CAMPAIGN SPENDING
Several issues arise in using instrumental variables in
TSLS regression. Instruments should include factors that do
not have an independent effect on the vote (Bartels 1991:
790; Gerber 1998: 401). This blunts the potential criticism
of interaction between the instruments and the error term of
the vote share equation. Second, the stronger the relationship between the instruments and the explanatory variables
they replace, the more precise the TSLS estimates in the
second-stage equation will be (Green and Krasno 1988:
896; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991: 161). A final caution is
that incumbent spending and challenger spending are both
endogenous variables that need to be replaced by spending
instruments in a second-stage model of the vote. Challengers spend more money as their viability increases, and
incumbents spend more money when they are vulnerable to
defeat (Gerber 1998: 402).
With this in mind, instruments were constructed for
incumbent and challenger spending with the help of variables that do not directly drive incumbents’ vote share.4 The
approach is similar to that used by Gerber (1998) in his
TSLS analysis of U.S. Senate races. First, candidate spending
varies with the length of the campaign. Due to differences in
primary scheduling, the number of days in the general election period varies by state. For example, the campaign for
governor in Illinois (seven and a half months) is four times
longer than in Minnesota (about two months). The more
time incumbents and challengers have to raise funds, the
more they should spend. A second factor that drives candidate spending is state size (total land area). The larger the
state, the more candidates need to spend to reach every eligible voter. This is because the per-voter costs of candidate
travel, staff, grassroots organization, and TV advertising are
higher in states where voters are geographically dispersed
(Beyle 1996).
Third, a state’s voting-age population should be inversely
related to spending due to the role of out-of-state donors
and political action committees (Gerber 1998: 405).
Because these contributions are independent of state population, candidates from smaller states tend to spend more
money per voter than candidates from larger states.5 Fourth,
the basic cost of goods and services varies by state, as represented by the Leonard-Friar index (Friar, Leonard, and

4

5

To control for state population, all subsequent references to candidate
spending refer to spending per eligible state voter.
It is also plausible that candidates from states with higher per-capita
incomes should spend more than do candidates from poorer states. Most
campaign contributors come from the ranks of the well to do. A variable
measuring state per-capita income was included in an earlier version of
the model, but results were not significant.

99
Walder 1996), a consumer price index for the 50 states.6
Fifth, the model includes a control for party affiliation.
Because Republican contributors tend to be fairly affluent,
Republicans often have advantages in fundraising in state
and federal campaigns (Herrnson 2000). Sixth, it controls
for self-financed (often independently wealthy) challengers.
These challengers can be expected to spend more than challengers who run under campaign finance restrictions.7
It is also important to control for the diversity of campaign finance laws in the states. These laws regulate spending in gubernatorial races indirectly (via contribution limits)
and sometimes directly (via public funding and spending
limits). Intuitively, contribution limits should influence
spending because these limits set the increments at which
candidates raise money. The limits effectively constrain
wealthy donors who could otherwise contribute more
(Hogan 1999; Malbin and Gais 1998). As the level of states’
limits on individual contributions increases, spending
should increase.8 As for public funding, candidates who
accept the subsidies must agree to limit their aggregate
spending. Studies at the state level show that candidates
who accept public funding spend less than do candidates
who refuse it or lack access to it (Malbin and Gais 1998;
Mayer and Wood 1995). Spending should also vary with the
level of spending limits (Gross and Goidel 2001).
To test for the effects of challenger quality, this study uses
a modified version of Squire’s (1992) measure to classify
challengers on a six-point scale from former governors (five
points) to amateurs (zero).9 Higher quality should lead to

6

7

8

9

The Leonard-Friar index used here is for the year 1995. Variance among
the states on the index is consistent from one year to the next. Media
market costs are a better predictor of the cost of campaigns than state
inflation rates, but accurate state-level data on media market costs are
unavailable for the time frame of this study.
Some might argue that personal wealth has an independent effect on the
vote and so is an invalid instrument. This study found no evidence that
voters prefer self-financed challengers to other challengers, controlling
for the effects of their higher spending. This is consistent with recent
research on spending effects (Gerber 1998: 407).
Individual contribution limits were used as a proxy for state contribution
limits. Individual donations are by far the largest source of funding in
gubernatorial races. Early specifications of the model controlled for
limits on political parties, PACs, corporations, and labor unions. None of
the limits were significant, and all of them are highly correlated with
individual limits (from .44 to .79). Some states allow unlimited contributions, while others set limits of varying levels. To measure the impact
of levels of limits, not just their presence or absence, states with unlimited contributions were assigned the value of the highest individual
limits ($28,000 in New York). This preserves the most information from
the variable and is not problematic because spending is comparable in
unlimited and high-limit states. In comparing mean per-voter spending
for these two categories of states (high-limit states equal those with individual limits of $5,000 or more), T-tests indicted that spending is not
significantly higher in unlimited contribution states.
State officeholders and U.S. House members (four), state legislators
(three), local officials (two), and other political leaders (one) were scored
based on established career ladders. Former officeholders were penalized
a point to reflect a decline in their statewide visibility. Candidates whose
celebrity translated into statewide name recognition receive a score of
four, commensurate with state officeholders. Celebrities in this study
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 TABLE 1
PREDICTING INCUMBENT SPENDING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
Variable

Without Job Approval

With Job Approval

Length of the Campaign (days)
State Land Area (1,000s of sq. miles)
State Voting-Age Population (millions)
Leonard-Friar State CPI (avg. = 1.00)
Candidate Party (Dem. = 1)
Self-Financed Challenger (yes = 1)
Acceptance of Public Funding
Opponent Accepts Public Funding
Spending Limits ($ per voter)
Individual Limits ($1,000s)
Challenger Quality
Normal Party Vote
Incumbent Opposed in Primary
State Unemployment Rate
Incumbent Job Approval

.003 (.001)**
.002 (.001)**
–.027 (.008)**
.965 (.492)**
–.062 (.063)
.106 (.097)
–.435 (.184)**
.114 (.117)
.416 (.252)*
–.001 (.003)
.042 (.020)*
–.003 (.004)
.074 (.060)
–.016 (.015)
—

.002 (.001)**
.001 (.001)
–.017 (.010)*
.108 (.604)
–.023 (.075)
.103 (.112)
–.513 (.189)**
.282 (.123)*
.316 (.261)
.005 (.003)
.020 (.022)
–.005 (.005)
.060 (.076)
–.036 (.023)
–.010 (.003)**

Constant

–.488 (.588)

1.210 (.792)

Number of Cases
2

R

118

85

.414

.445

Note: The dependent variable is general election spending per eligible voter, in constant 1990 dollars. *p < .05, **p < .01 (one-tailed). Standard errors are
in parentheses.

higher challenger spending because contributors see that
experienced challengers are more viable than amateurs
(Bardwell 2002). Incumbent spending should also rise with
challenger quality because incumbents spend reactively in
the face of a viable threat (Green and Krasno 1990). Finally,
research shows a strong relationship between incumbent
vulnerability and campaign spending. When incumbents are
vulnerable, both incumbents and challengers spend more
(Gross and Goidel 2001; Kahn and Kenney 1999). One
measure of incumbent vulnerability is the state economy
(Gerber 1998), as represented by the state unemployment
rate in the election year.10 Popularity ratings also reflect precampaign incumbent vulnerability and should have an
impact spending. The model includes a measure of statewide
job approval of the governor in the year before the election.11
Tables 1 and 2 list the first-stage results (predicting
incumbent spending and challenger spending, respectively)

10

11

include George W. Bush (TX), Jeb Bush (FL), and baseball player Jim
Bunning (KY). Information on candidates’ political experience was
compiled from various issues of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
State unemployment data are available online at http://www.unl.
edu/SPPQ and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site.
To measure incumbents’ popularity, this study used the governors’
mean job approval ratings in the year before the election (Beyle, Niemi,
and Sigelman 2002). These ratings are available online at
http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/jars.html. To control for variance in state
poll questions, responses were collapsed into percent positive and percent negative categories. For example, “excellent” and “good” reflect
approval; “fair” and “poor” represent disapproval. For more details, see
the above Internet site or Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman (2002).

from a TSLS regression.12 To highlight the importance of
including incumbent popularity in the models, results are
listed with and without a control for governors’ pre-campaign job approval rating. Table 1 (column 1) shows that it
costs more for incumbents to run in states where the campaign is longer, where the area the campaign must cover is
larger, and where the cost of goods and services is higher.
Population is inversely related to spending due to the role of
out-of-state donors in these races. Incumbents spend more
when facing experienced challengers. As for public financing, acceptance of public funding leads to lower spending by
incumbents, and the level of spending limits also matters.
This negative hit for incumbents who take public funds is
not surprising because incumbents are more likely than challengers are to bump up against aggregate spending limits.
Column 2 of Table 1 adds a control for governors’ job
approval ratings. This measure sets a pre-campaign baseline
for expected spending. Put simply, it keeps the other variables that affect spending from being credited for a fundraising climate that already existed due to a safe or vulnerable
incumbent. The addition produces some interesting findings. First, the R2 of the model increases. Second, some variables that came through in the previous model (land area,
spending limits, and challenger quality) are not statistically
significant. Incumbent popularity seems to have subsumed
12

Given concerns about time-series cross-sectional data, panel-corrected
standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) were calculated for OLS coefficients in the first stage, but the results did not change. Table 1 and Table
2 list the standard errors from the original analysis.
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 TABLE 2
PREDICTING CHALLENGER SPENDING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
Variable
Length of the Campaign (days)
State Land Area (1,000s of sq. miles)
State Voting-Age Population (millions)
Leonard-Friar State CPI (avg. = 1.00)
Candidate Party (Dem. = 1)
Self-Financed Challenger (yes = 1)
Acceptance of Public Funding
Opponent Accepts Public Funding
Spending Limits ($ per voter)
Individual Limits ($1,000s)
Challenger Quality
Normal Party Vote
Incumbent Opposed in Primary
State Unemployment Rate
Incumbent Job Approval
Constant

Without Job Approval

With Job Approval

.002 (.001)*
.003 (.001)**
–.043 (.011)**
1.491 (.671)**
–.083 (.085)
.498 (.133)**
–.235 (.159)
–.094 (.117)
.945 (.343)**
–.003 (.004)
.055 (.027)*
.001 (.006)
.136 (.082)*
.012 (.020)
—

.002 (.001)*
–.001 (.001)
–.028 (.011)**
.022 (.657)
–.025 (.082)
.562 (.121)**
.034 (.133)
–.237 (.206)
.704 (.284)**
.005 (.004)
.043 (.024)*
–.004 (.005)
.127 (.083)
–.027 (.025)
–.018 (.003)**

-1.521 (.801)*

Number of Cases
2

R

1.461 (.862)*

118

85

.471

.644

Note: The dependent variable is general election spending per eligible voter, in constant 1990 dollars. *p < .05, **p < .01 (one-tailed). Standard errors are in
parentheses.

their effects. Third, the relationship between governors’ job
approval and fundraising is negative; the more popular
incumbents are, the less they spend. This fits what we know
from recent research; incumbents spend more when their
re-election bids are seriously threatened (Erikson and Palfrey 2000; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1990).
Table 2 illustrates the determinants of challengers’
spending levels. Some of the same factors come through
here (column 1) as they did for incumbents. As expected,
self-financed challengers spend much more than other candidates do. Challenger quality has a visible effect on the
amount of money challengers spend. A gubernatorial challenger with experience in the U.S. House spends $0.20
more per voter than a political amateur does (median
spending for all challengers is $0.35). Another measure of
incumbent vulnerability, whether the governor was opposed
in the primary, is positively related to challenger spending.
Challengers spend more when incumbents have contested
primaries. When the control for the governor’s popularity is
added (column 2), the R2 increases substantially, and some
variables drop out. The coefficient for gubernatorial popularity in this model is double the size of that in the incumbent spending model. Even if vulnerable incumbents reap
an increase in their total fundraising, they may still lose
ground (on a dollar-for-dollar basis) to challengers.
MODELING THE VOTE IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
The dependent variable in the second stage of TSLS
analysis is incumbents’ share of the two-party vote in

gubernatorial general elections from 1980 to 2000. As is
standard in TSLS regression, the predicted values for spending from the first stage of the analysis are instruments for
spending in the second-stage model of vote share (Gerber
1998). The data used in this study represents general election spending, instead of the election-cycle spending used
in prior studies of the gubernatorial vote. As such, the
results are less likely to be biased by levels of primary competition, a fact that is important because in many states one
party or another is historically dominant (for example,
Democratic governors in the South). Although campaign
spending is the variable of primary interest, this analysis
controls for other factors that are expected to influence
incumbents’ share of the two-party gubernatorial vote.
Evidence from House and Senate elections shows that,
on average, incumbents who face experienced challengers
win a smaller share of the vote than do incumbents who
face political amateurs (Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson
1980; Squire 1992). As before, a modification of Squire’s
measure creates a six-point challenger quality scale based
on established career ladders. The model also includes two
controls for state partisanship. A dummy for candidate
party will indicate any systematic or national partisan
advantage in gubernatorial races (Squire 1989). The model
also captures the normal vote for governor in each state, as
represented by the average share of the two-party vote won
by the incumbent’s party in the last three gubernatorial
elections. The more successful the incumbent’s party in
prior general elections, the larger the current incumbent’s
share of the vote should be.
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 TABLE 3
THE EFFECTS OF INCUMBENT AND CHALLENGER SPENDING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
Incumbents’ Share of the Vote (%)
__________________________________________________________
TSLS with
OLS
TSLS
Job Approval

Variable
Incumbent Spending
Challenger Spending
Challenger Quality
Incumbent Party (Dem. = 1)
Normal Party Vote
Incumbent Opposed in Primary
State Unemployment
Incumbent Job Approval

–2.083 (4.351)
–7.885 (1.998)**
–.657 (.445)
.094 (.532)
–.063 (.104)
–1.326 (1.458)
–.007 (.478)
.324 (.078)**

8.562 (5.156)*
–6.585 (3.177)*
–1.073 (.559)*
2.265 (1.821)
–.093 (.125)
–3.063 (1.735)*
–.597 (.426)
—

–.855 (4.021)
–6.928 (3.103)*
–.676 (.448)
.285 (1.578)
–.049 (.107)
–1.333 (1.467)
.123 (.512)
.362 (.096)**

Constant

52.135 (9.712)**

68.929 (8.346)**

47.273 (11.808)**

Number of Cases
2

R

85

118

85

.305

.182

.596

Note: The dependent variable is incumbents’ share of the two-party vote in general elections.
*p < .05, **p < .01 (one-tailed). Standard errors are in parentheses.

Three other variables in the model reflect the vulnerability
of the incumbent governor. First, a dummy variable reflects
whether the incumbent was opposed in the primary election.
Incumbents who escaped a primary fight should win a larger
share of the vote than incumbents who emerged from divisive
primaries (Kenney and Rice 1984). Second, a measure of state
unemployment captures the incumbent governor’s responsibility for the state economy (Svoboda 1995). As the unemployment rate increases from state to state, incumbents’ share
of the vote should decline. Third, the model controls for
incumbent popularity using the governor’s mean job approval
rating in the year before the election. This measure of incumbent vulnerability is the key to the model because it sets a precampaign baseline for the incumbent’s expected vote. It differentiates the effects of campaign-related variables on the
vote (spending effects) from the impact of pre-existing levels
of gubernatorial popularity.
RESULTS
Table 3 lists the coefficients from three models of the
gubernatorial vote from 1980 to 2000.13 The dependent
variable is incumbents’ share of the two-party vote in
13

Other specifications of the normal vote measure were tried, including
using the state presidential vote, a combination of gubernatorial and
presidential results, and survey data on partisanship in state public
opinion (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). None of the measures had
any effect, again pointing to how individualized gubernatorial races
have become. Analyses of spending effects sometimes use the log of
spending to account for the potential of diminishing marginal returns,
especially for incumbent spending. An alternative model tested using
the log of spending reduced the fit of the model. Challenger spending
remained statistically significant, and incumbent spending still had no
effect. Thus, the original spending measure was retained.

general elections. For the sake of comparison, Table 3 presents results from OLS regression in column one. As is often
the case in research on spending effects, the OLS coefficients
for incumbent spending are negative and statistically
insignificant. Meanwhile, challenger spending has a strong
negative effect on incumbents’ share of the vote. Incumbents’ job approval ratings in the year before the election are
strongly related to their eventual performance at the polls
on election day. The model fit is excellent; it explains nearly
two-thirds of the variance in incumbents’ share of the vote.
But because OLS does not correct for simultaneity bias,
these results on the impact of incumbent spending in gubernatorial races are not definitive.
The second and third columns of Table 3 list results from
TSLS regression. The second column presents coefficients
from a model without the measure for incumbents’ job
approval. At first glance, the results seem to confirm recent
work by Gerber (1998) that finds comparable spending-onvote effects for incumbents and challengers. The coefficients
for both types of candidates are statistically significant. The
variables for challenger quality and incumbents facing
opposition in the primary both behave as expected. But the
overall fit of the model tells another story. Despite expected
relationships, the R2 is low. These results are best interpreted
cautiously because so much variance is unexplained and
because it is likely that gubernatorial job approval is correlated with spending and with the vote.
The recent availability of data on gubernatorial job
approval ratings (Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman 2002) allows
a quick test of the robustness of our findings regarding
spending effects. Column three of Table 3 list TSLS coefficients from an equation that includes the governor’s mean
job approval rating in the pre-election year as a measure of
incumbent vulnerability. The control effectively works like a
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lagged dependent variable to highlight change in the incumbent’s popularity from the pre-campaign period to election
day.14 The results of this specification show that while challenger spending effectively draws down incumbents’ share
of the vote, incumbent spending does not have a significant
effect on their vote share. Put simply, spending during the
campaign year does not win governors support over and
above the baseline of support they had already enjoyed
before the campaign began.15
An important practical question is whether this news
should bring hope to challengers in gubernatorial elections.
If incumbent spending is ineffective and challenger spending is highly effective, does this create the potential for substantial numbers of well-funded challengers to defeat
incumbents? The short answer is that it is unlikely. First, the
magnitude of challengers’ spending coefficient is consistent
in all of the models; a dollar per voter increase in spending
reduces incumbents’ vote share by 7 percent. This is tempered by a stark reality: only 37 percent of the challengers
in this study spent $0.50 per voter, and just 13 percent were
able to raise and spend $1.00 per voter. As a result, few
challengers were in a position to elicit (using increased campaign spending) more than a one- or two-point vote swing.
Of course, the actual margins of these races also matter. If
each challenger in this study had spent $0.25 more per
voter, only five more incumbents would have been defeated
from 1980 to 2000.
CONCLUSIONS
This study sheds new light on the recent debate over the
effects of incumbent spending. Using existing data (Beyle
and Jensen 2001) and state campaign finance files, it
extends research on campaign spending to general elections
for governor. By correcting for simultaneity bias, this study
provides the most thorough assessment of spending effects
14

15

Gubernatorial approval ratings in the year before the election closely
approximate governors’ eventual share of the two-party vote. The variables are highly correlated (.67) and share a similar range: 20 to 80 percent for job approval, and 26 to 81 percent for vote share. Their means
(56.7 for approval to 59.2 for vote share), medians (57.0 and 59.6), and
standard deviations (12.9 to 9.6) are also comparable. Given possible
interaction between popularity and spending (i.e. spending may matter
more when incumbents are vulnerable and less when they are safe), an
earlier model was run with interaction terms for campaign spending
and job approval. The interaction terms for incumbents and challengers
were not statistically significant, and the substantive effects of the original spending and job approval variables did not change.
While this study finds no effect for incumbent spending, Erikson and
Palfrey (2000) suggest that incumbent spending and challenger spending are equally effective in close races. To test this hypothesis, data were
separated into two subsets based on race margin (less than and more
than 7.5 percent) and TSLS regression was conducted for each group.
Incumbent spending was not significant in either case, implying that
the finding of no impact for incumbent spending is not due to combining safe and competitive races. Some may argue that incumbents’ early
spending buys general election votes even if general election spending
does not. Primary spending was included in an earlier specification of
the model, but it was not significant.
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in gubernatorial races to date. In his research on House
races, Jacobson (1978, 2000) argues that spending by
incumbents is largely ineffective because these candidates
are so well known. Using newly available data on gubernatorial job approval ratings (Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman
2002), this study shows that this theory squares well with
the last 20 years of gubernatorial elections. Using job
approval ratings in the year before the election as a pre-campaign baseline for the incumbent’s popularity, this analysis
finds that incumbent spending does not have an independent effect on the vote.
These findings speak to whether campaign finance reform
might make elections more competitive. If challengers’ current return on campaign spending is good but is not enough
to be decisive in most races, this has implications for public
funding programs. It means that funding levels would need
to be high to have any effect on competition. Based on this
study, the level needed is around one dollar per voter, a figure
much higher than average challenger spending in recent
gubernatorial races. The level of spending limits that public
funding programs employ is not crucial to competition
because, in practice, the limits primarily cap incumbent
spending that is ineffective on a dollar-per-vote basis. So
when both fundraising and spending are taken into consideration, Jacobson’s (1978) fear that spending limits could make
races less competitive seems overblown in light of current
spending levels. Finally, while scholars have hotly debated
whether lower contribution limits might hurt challengers,
this study finds that these limits have no effect on incumbent
or challenger spending. Taken as a whole, this study suggests
that the potential for campaign finance reform to improve the
lot of challengers is modest and would be achieved primarily
by way of generous public funding programs.
This analysis points to new avenues for research on spending effects. Given the recent availability of state-level job
approval data for U.S. Senators (Beyle et al 2002), existing
models of the Senate vote could be re-specified and tested in
light of the findings here. Senate elections share much in
common with gubernatorial races. Would the findings of
Gerber (1998) hold in the face of controls for pre-campaign
incumbent popularity? Second, new data on campaign
spending in gubernatorial races (separated for primary and
general elections) will enable us to test hypotheses from congressional elections in the gubernatorial context. New studies
on the interaction between war chests, incumbent vulnerability, the emergence of quality challengers, and public funding
(Epstein and Zemsky 1995; Krasno and Green 1988; Squire
1991; Bardwell 2002) are just a few promising options. The
link between money and competition is complex. But if
scholars can isolate when spending matters in campaigns, this
research will continue to shed light on debates over campaign
finance reform and electoral competition.
APPENDIX
For this study, spending data were compiled for gubernatorial races from 1980 to 2000. Unlike previous research
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on election-cycle spending in races for governor (Gross and
Goidel 2001; Partin 2002; Patterson 1982), this analysis
treats general elections separately. In the past, the lack of
standardized state campaign finance data has prevented separate research on primary and general elections (Squire
1992). Yet it is important to have separate spending data for
these two types of races because they feature different opponents and constituencies, different patterns of spending,
and varied levels of competition (Epstein and Zemsky
1995). While some primary spending is undoubtedly targeted toward general election success, the use of general
election data is a better compromise than using multi-year
election-cycle data that would largely reflect the competitiveness of the primary period. The data in this study come
directly from the files of state campaign finance agencies.
Only a few states publish separate spending totals for the
two periods because reporting dates do not always coincide
with the start of the general election. State agencies were
asked for and provided copies of gubernatorial candidate
files for each reporting period in the general election. Then
these spending totals were compiled to reflect most accurately the full general election period. This means that 30
percent of candidate spending cases reflect a slightly earlier
or later start than the actual general election period. In these
cases, the mean difference between the actual and imposed
start of the general election period is 11.7 days. In this
study, December 31 marks the end of the general election
period, at which point spending has slowed to a trickle.
Inclusion of this post-election spending accounts for late
payments for general election spending. For some races in
the early 1980s (less than a quarter of the cases), general
election spending data gathered directly from state agencies
by Beyle and Jensen (2001) are used.
Missing data occur for reasons that are familiar to scholars who work with state records and archives. Data for a few
races in the 1980s are unavailable because some states temporarily archived spending data but destroyed reports as
space constraints dictated. State record keeping is meticulous in most agencies, but a few spending reports were
unavailable or came up missing. Due to budget shortages in
a few states, scholars are actually required to visit state
archives in person to fill research requests. In these cases,
gathering data on candidate spending was cost prohibitive.
As more states mandate electronic disclosure of campaign
finance data, many of these problems will be alleviated.
While not perfect, the data in this study are the best available on spending in gubernatorial general elections and
cover 77 percent of all incumbent-challenger contests from
1980 to 2000.
REFERENCES
Abramowitz, Alan I. 1988. “Explaining Senate Election Outcomes.” American Political Science Review 82: 385-403.
_____. 1991. “Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline
of Competition in US House Elections.” Journal of Politics
53:34-56.

Bardwell, Kedron. 2002. “Money and Challenger Emergence in
Gubernatorial Primaries.” Political Research Quarterly 55 (3):
653-67.
Bartels, Larry M. 1991. “Instrumental and ‘Quasi-Instrumental’
Variables.” American Journal of Political Science 35: 777-800.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What To Do (and
Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data.” American
Political Science Review 89: 634-47.
Beyle, Thad L. 1986. “The Cost of Becoming Governor.” State Government 59: 95-101.
_____. 1990a. “Costs of Gubernatorial Campaigns: 1987.” Comparative State Politics 11: 28-29.
_____. 1990b. “Costs of Gubernatorial Campaigns: 1988.” Comparative State Politics 11: 30-32.
_____. 1991. “Costs of 1990 the Gubernatorial Campaigns.” Comparative State Politics 12: 3-7.
_____. 1996. “The Cost of Winning.” State Government News
39:10-14.
Beyle, Thad L., and Jennifer Jensen. 2001. “Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures Database.” http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/
guber.html (February 20).
Beyle, Thad L., Richard G. Niemi, and Lee Sigelman. 2002.
“Gubernatorial, Senatorial, and State-Level Presidential Job
Approval: The U.S. Officials Job Approval Ratings (JAR) Collection.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 2: 215-29.
Epstein, David, and Peter Zemsky. 1995. “Money Talks: Deterring
Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections.” American
Political Science Review 89: 295-308.
Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1998. “Campaign
Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach.” Journal of Politics 60: 355-73.
_____. 2000. “Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory
and Data.” American Political Science Review 94: 595-609.
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald Wright, and John McIver. 1993. Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American
States. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Friar, Monica E., Herman B. Leonard, and Jay H. Walder. 1996.
“The Federal Budget and the States.” http://www.ksg.harvard.
edu/fisc99/FY1995/FY1995Complete.pdf (July 1, 2001).
Gerber, Alan. 1998. “Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending
on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables.”
American Political Science Review 92: 401-11.
Green, Donald P., and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. “Salvation for the
Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign
Spending in House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 32: 884-907.
_____. 1990. “Rebuttal to Jacobson’s ‘New Evidence for Old Arguments’.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 363-72.
Gross, Donald A., and Robert K. Goidel. 2001. “The Impact of
State Campaign Finance Laws.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 1: 180-95.
Herrnson, Paul S. 2000. Congressional Elections, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Hogan, Robert E. 1999. “Campaign Spending in State Legislative Primary Elections.” State and Local Government Review 31: 214-20.
Jacobson, Gary C. 1978. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in
Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 72:
469-91.
_____. 1980. Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven, CT:
Yale Press.
_____. 1985. “Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional
Elections, 1972-1982.” Public Choice 47: 7-62.

Downloaded from prq.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on June 11, 2013

PRQ_March05_III

3/24/05

9:19 AM

Page 105

REEVALUATING SPENDING IN GUBERNATORIAL RACES
_____. 1990. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments.” American Journal of
Political Science 34: 334-62.
_____. 2000. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5th ed. New
York: Longman.
Kahn, Kim Fridkin, and Patrick J. Kenney. 1999. The Spectacle of
U.S. Senate Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Kenney, Patrick J., and Tom W. Rice. 1984. “The Effect of Primary
Divisiveness in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections.” Journal
of Politics 46: 904-15.
Kenny, Christopher, and Michael McBurnett. 1992. “A Dynamic
Model of the Effect of Campaign Spending on Congressional
Vote Choice.” American Journal of Political Science 36: 923-37.
_____. 1994. “An Individual-Level Multiequation Model of Expenditure Effects in Contested House Elections.” American Political
Science Review 88: 699-707.
Krasno, Jonathan S., and Donald P. Green. 1988. “Preempting
Quality Challengers in House Elections.” Journal of Politics 50:
920-36.
Malbin, Michael J., and Thomas L. Gais. 1998. The Day After
Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the States.
Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute Press.
Mayer, Kenneth R., and John M. Wood. 1995. “The Impact of
Public Financing on Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from
Wisconsin, 1964-1990.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20: 69-88.
Partin, Randall W. 1995. “Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections.” American Politics Quarterly 23: 81-95.

105
_____. 2002. “Assessing the Impact of Campaign Spending in
Governor’s Races.” Political Research Quarterly 30: 213-33.
Patterson, Samuel C. 1982. “Campaign Spending in Contests for
Governor.” Western Political Quarterly 35: 457-77.
Piereson, James E. 1977. “Sources of Candidate Success in Gubernatorial Elections, 1910-1970.” Journal of Politics 39: 683-94.
Pindyck, Robert S., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1991. Econometric
Models and Economic Forecasts, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Squire, Peverill. 1989. “Challengers in U.S. Senate Elections.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 531-47.
_____. 1991. “Preemptive Fundraising and Challenger Profile in
Senate Elections.” Journal of Politics 53:1150-64.
_____. 1992. “Challenger Profile in Gubernatorial Elections.”
Western Political Quarterly 45:125-42.
Squire, Peverill, and Christina Fastnow. 1994. “Comparing Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections.” Western Political Quarterly
47:705-20.
Svoboda, Craig J. 1995. “Retrospective Voting in Gubernatorial
Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 48:117-34.
Tompkins, Mark E. 1984. “The Electoral Fortunes of Gubernatorial Incumbents, 1947-1981.” Journal of Politics 46: 520-40.

Received: January 13, 2004
Accepted for Publication: March 2, 2004
bardwek@gvsu.edu

Downloaded from prq.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on June 11, 2013

